The new Sahelian juntas have rebranded the soldier as saviour. In Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, military rule now wears the garment of liberation — presented as the lesser evil compared to democratic sheriffs who plunder state coffers while chanting constitutional hymns. When democracy repeatedly fails to deliver development, citizens begin to flirt with alternatives. As Afrobarometer data shows, support for elections weakens when they fail to hold leaders accountable.
Africa’s tragedy is not that its people reject democracy. On the contrary, Africans’ demand for democracy remains durable. What they reject is deception masquerading as democracy.
In theory, elections are the heartbeat of democracy. In practice, across parts of Africa, they have become elite choreography — ritualistic performances where outcomes are whispered long before ballots are cast. Lindberg advanced that repeated elections could deepen democracy over time. But repetition without reform produces fatigue, not freedom.
Nigeria illustrates this paradox. Since returning to civilian rule in 1999, elections have been held regularly. Yet democracy feels less like popular sovereignty and more like what I call “capture.” Institutions meant to referee the contest — electoral commissions, courts, and security agencies are often accused of partisan compromise. As Cheeseman and Klaas document across African contexts, electoral manipulation no longer requires tanks; it requires control of institutions, money, and narrative.
Money, indeed, dictates outcomes. The infamous “Ghana-Must-Go” bags of cash deployed for vote-buying reduce citizenship to a transaction. Elections become investment portfolios; governance becomes dividend extraction. Development suffers. When leadership selection is based on financial muscle rather than policy competence, public goods become private spoils. Infrastructure decays, unemployment festers, and education stagnates.
Democracy in Nigeria is in an Intensive Care Unit — breathing, but heavily sedated.
Godfatherism compounds the capture. As I once wrote, “If my godfatherism is stronger than yours,” then the throne is secured. A godfather is a political juggler whose wealth and influence determine who ascends to office legitimately or otherwise. The result is a quasi-monarchical democracy where power circulates within patronage networks. Nyong’o warned decades ago that Africa’s one-party logic, centralised control and elite consolidation could survive under a multiparty disguise. Today, that warning echoes. Nigeria’s multiparty democracy lies bruised and sedated in intensive care, clinging to a life not yet pronounced dead.
Meanwhile, the Peoples Democratic Party, Labour Party, African Democratic Congress, and the newly adopted orphan, Nigeria Democratic Congress, are electorally emaciated and bound by legal handcuffs.
Foreign influence further complicates the theatre. When aspirants debate in London or Washington before addressing domestic constituencies, it signals where validation is sought. While international election observation missions from the European Union, African Union, and Economic Community of West African States aim to strengthen credibility, their presence also underscores the fragility of trust in domestic institutions. Observers frequently note irregularities, low turnout, and vote-buying, raising questions about legitimacy.
The development consequences are severe. Sustainable development requires accountable institutions. The status quo is that democracy enhances development by enabling participation, transparency, and responsive governance. But when elections are captured, these mechanisms malfunction. Development planning becomes politicised; state resources serve regime survival rather than citizen welfare.
Across the continent, a “third wave of autocratisation” is unfolding, said Lührmann & Lindberg. Leaders increasingly manipulate legal frameworks rather than abolish elections outright. Across Africa, incumbent governments weaponise state machinery to tilt the electoral playing field. Tanzania’s recent shifts, as Paget observes, reveal how electoral systems can mutate while retaining democratic vocabulary. Senegal’s recent democratic resilience demonstrates that decline is not inevitable, but resilience requires institutional integrity.
When elections fail to deliver accountability, development stalls. Youth frustration grows. Afrobarometer 2023 even reports rising tolerance for military intervention among young Africans — a dangerous signal. If democracy does not produce roads, jobs, electricity, and justice, its moral authority erodes.
Elections, therefore, are not mere political rituals; they are a development infrastructure. When functioning, they allocate power peacefully, incentivise performance, and anchor policy continuity. When captured, they distort incentives, entrench corruption, and weaken economic growth.
If I were to define democracy in one word in the Nigerian context, that word would be “capture”. But capture is not destiny. Institutional reform, civic vigilance, and credible electoral management can reverse decline.
The choice before Africa is stark: deepen democratic substance or watch democratic form decay into authoritarian nostalgia.
Democracy must move from choreography to accountability. Otherwise, the ICU drip may soon be unplugged.
Taoheed Dauda, a Mastercard Foundation Scholar, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, writes via [email protected]
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