The swift arrest of the kidnappers of a former Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Olu Falae, in September 2015, briefly showcased the promise of a new policing approach introduced by former Inspector General of Police (IGP), Solomon Arase.
At the time, Mr Arase described intelligence-led policing as “the ultimate for Nigeria,” arguing that modern law enforcement must be driven by intelligence gathering, analysis and coordinated response rather than reactive policing.
More than a decade later, kidnapping has evolved into one of Nigeria’s most persistent security challenges. While intelligence-led policing remains part of modern law-enforcement practice, the trajectory of the initiative raises broader questions about a challenge confronting many Nigerian institutions: how to build technology-enabled reforms that endure beyond their initial launch.
Over the past two decades, Nigeria has launched numerous digital governance platforms aimed at improving public service delivery, identity management, financial governance and citizen engagement. While some—such as the National Identification Number (NIN), Bank Verification Number (BVN) and Treasury Single Account (TSA)—have become integral to governance, many others have been abandoned, superseded, only partially implemented or left dormant due to policy shifts, weak institutional ownership and funding constraints. This fragmented approach has prompted the Nigerian government to introduce stricter oversight of public-sector digital investments after acknowledging widespread duplication of systems, poor interoperability and high project failure rates.
The experience of the 2015 intelligence-led policing initiative offers a useful lens for examining the difficulties of building sustainable digital public infrastructure within Nigeria’s security sector.

From policing reform to institutional challenge
Intelligence-led policing is generally understood as a policing model that relies on the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence to guide operational and strategic decisions, according to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
At the time the policing initiative was launched in Nigeria, it appeared to offer a scalable response to emerging security threats, particularly kidnapping. Security sources and media reports indicate that the initiative contributed to tactical gains, including disrupting kidnapping networks in parts of the country.
A senior police officer familiar with the initiative said intelligence sharing improved during the period, enabling specialised units such as the Intelligence Response Team (IRT) to act on what he described as “evidence-based and actionable” information.
Yet despite its early visibility, the initiative gradually faded from public discussion. PREMIUM TIMES sought clarification from former police spokesperson Anthony Placid on how the programme evolved, whether any associated technology platforms remain operational, and how intelligence-sharing systems are currently managed, but the police did not respond.
Responding to questions during a joint security briefing at the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in Abuja, Mr Placid’s successor, Anietie Iniedu, said the force has evolved from intelligence-led policing to an intelligence-led, community collaborative policing model.
“We’ve seen that intelligence alone won’t help us, and so we’ve gone far to create collaborative processes with our communities,” said Mr Iniedu, a chief superintendent of police (CSP).
The police spokesperson did not directly respond to the question of why the earlier intelligence-led policing approach introduced under former Mr Arase did not achieve its intended impact.
However, there is no evidence that intelligence gathering or intelligence-based operations have ceased within the police. Rather, the questions raised by the initiative’s trajectory point to broader concerns about institutional ownership, sustainability and long-term technological capacity.
A growing kidnapping economy
The challenge has become more urgent as kidnapping continues to expand across the country.
According to data obtained from SBM Intelligence, at least 4,722 Nigerians were abducted in 997 incidents between July 2024 and June 2025. During the same period, kidnappers reportedly demanded nearly N48 billion and received more than N2.5 billion in ransom payments.
Although the number of abductees declined from 7,568 recorded between July 2023 and June 2024 to 4,722 in the following year, ransom demands increased sharply from approximately N10.9 billion to N48 billion.
Analysts say the figures suggest that kidnapping groups may be extracting greater value from fewer incidents while operating with increasing sophistication.
Addressing such threats requires more than tactical operations. It also requires institutions capable of collecting, analysing and sharing information across jurisdictions and agencies.
Yet experts say this remains a persistent challenge.
Yahuza Agumi, a grassroots conflict researcher in Niger State, said intelligence is frequently siloed between agencies and often remains localised unless joint task forces are established.
The result, analysts argue, is a security environment in which criminal activities frequently follow identifiable patterns but remain difficult to prevent because information and response mechanisms are disjointed.
When digital systems fail to become institutions
Experts say one of the most common challenges facing public-sector technology reforms is the failure to transform digital systems into durable institutions.
While technology can improve service delivery and operational effectiveness, its long-term success often depends on governance structures, sustainable funding, institutional ownership and internal technical expertise.
A former head of an intelligence unit in a North-central police command, who was not authorised to speak to the press, said a technology platform associated with the intelligence-led policing initiative became inoperable around 2021 after subscriptions required to keep it operational were no longer renewed.
The account could not be independently verified, and the police did not respond to enquiries seeking clarification. However, experts say the experience reflects a broader pattern affecting many public-sector digital initiatives.
According to Timi Olagunju, a technology lawyer and policy expert, many digital systems are deployed faster than institutions can absorb them.
“The recurring issues are a lack of digital leadership, politicisation of procurement processes, and limited technical understanding within the public sector,” Mr Olagunju said.
According to him, institutions frequently underestimate the long-term requirements of maintaining digital systems, including training, upgrades, technical support and operational continuity.
Leadership transitions can further complicate sustainability when new administrations or agency heads alter priorities, procurement plans or technology choices.
The role of private-sector expertise
The challenge has also highlighted the increasingly important role of private-sector expertise in supporting public institutions.
Public statements by police officials suggest that external technological support remains part of the broader security ecosystem.
In a 2024 post on X, former police spokesperson Muyiwa Adejobi acknowledged that some private companies provided tracking services and encouraged members of the public to share intelligence obtained through such firms with the police for further action.
“While the police work hard to get the equipment in all area commands, we can make use of what we have for now,” he wrote.
More recently, media reports linking intelligence firm Giga Forensics to investigations involving suspected armed robbers and murder suspects in Abuja have drawn attention to the growing role of specialised private-sector capabilities in law enforcement operations.
Neither the company nor the police responded to requests for comment regarding the nature of any collaboration.
Experts say such arrangements are not unusual. Around the world, governments routinely partner with private firms to access specialised technical expertise.
The challenge, however, is ensuring that such partnerships strengthen institutional capacity rather than create long-term dependence.
Why interoperability and institutional ownership matter
According to digital public infrastructure experts, sustainable digital systems require interoperability—the ability of different organisations, systems and technologies to exchange information and work together effectively through shared standards and governance frameworks.
The Digital Rights Lead at the Centre for Information Technology and Development (CITAD), Ali Sabo, said effective intelligence-led policing depends not only on technology but also on strong interagency coordination and clear rules governing information management.
According to him, intelligence systems in Nigeria often remain fragmented and governed by inconsistent standards for data sharing.
“Without clear rules on data ownership, storage, access, and protection, such systems become inefficient and vulnerable,” he said.
He added that limited in-house technical expertise can make institutions overly dependent on external actors while weakening institutional control over critical systems.
For national security institutions, he argued that continuity should not depend solely on commercial arrangements.
“When critical national security infrastructure is built on proprietary systems controlled by private vendors, it creates dependency risks,” Mr Sabo said.
He noted that open standards, local hosting arrangements and stronger institutional ownership are important safeguards against operational disruption.
The challenges identified by experts in the security sector mirror concerns raised in a 2025 Dataphyte study on emerging DPI in Nigeria. The study found that fragmented government systems, weak interoperability and the absence of coordinated digital frameworks continue to limit the effectiveness and sustainability of digital initiatives across public institutions. It recommended stronger governance frameworks, common standards and greater institutional coordination to ensure that digital systems remain functional over the long term.
Building digital public infrastructure that lasts
Experts say the lessons extend far beyond policing. According to Mr Olagunju, technology-driven reforms cannot succeed through software deployment alone. Sustainable systems require governance structures, trusted mechanisms for information sharing, skilled personnel and long-term funding commitments.
While partnerships with private technology firms can provide valuable expertise, he said they should be structured around knowledge transfer and institutional capacity building rather than permanent dependence.
He also recommended procurement models that prioritise interoperability, open standards and clearly defined transition arrangements.
Transparency, he added, remains equally important.
“A situation where even officers are unaware of the systems or vendors in use undermines accountability and institutional learning,” he said.
At the policy level, Mr Olagunju recommended stronger governance frameworks governing relationships between public institutions and technology providers, including clear standards for service delivery, data governance, knowledge transfer and operational continuity.
The broader lesson is not that technology partnerships are inherently flawed. Rather, Nigeria’s experience suggests that even promising technology-enabled reforms may struggle to deliver lasting impact when they are not institutionalised through sustainable funding, internal technical capacity, effective governance and long-term ownership.
The evolution of intelligence-led policing is therefore not simply about policing. It is also about state capacity and the challenge of transforming digital innovations into enduring public infrastructure.
This report is produced under the DPI Africa Journalism Fellowship Programme of the Media Foundation for West Africa and Co-Develop.













