The recent lightning assault by Malian insurgents that led them to overrun areas of Bamako and other cities in Mali is forcing many in the region to directly question Goita’s authority, the junta’s leadership and Mali’s partnership with Russian security forces. For many other African countries, the events in Mali over the last few days further raise questions as to any reliance on mercenary forces and instead consider more stable long-term partnerships.
Colonel Assimi Goita, Mali’s serving interim president, assumed his role following coups he led that ousted Boubacar Keita in 2020, and then the civilian transitional government that followed Keita in 2021.
A key factor behind Goita’s rise to power was the widespread anger and dissatisfaction amongst Malians and Malian soldiers about insecurity in Mali. Keita and his government were losing popularity against a constellation of growing insurgent groups, who were starting to wreak havoc across the country. History seems to be repeating itself in light of the recent attacks.
Much of the legitimacy Goita was initially afforded came from his senior military role. As a high-ranking army officer, he was seen as a rational candidate who could stamp out the growing insurgencies and restore peace to Mali. It is therefore shocking to see the extent of the failure of Goita’s Junta to restore security to Mali, following the recent wave of deadly attacks on Malian cities.
A recent BBC article by Makuochi Okafor and Mohamed Ibrahim lists the likely scenarios that recent violence could lead to. These are: the Junta stays in power, the Junta stays in power but needs to replace its Russian partner, or the Junta is overthrown in its third coup of the decade, and Mali is controlled by one of several factions of insurgent groups.
If the first two options are preferred over the third, to achieve either, significant resources and even lives will likely need to be expended to secure Mali. These, Mali cannot easily afford or muster, and Russia will be unwilling to underwrite, unless it gains a significant financial incentive to do so. The Junta’s expected counteroffensive will be a critical signal that analysts will use to try to understand what happens next for Goita and Mali. Either way, he and his leadership have suffered a mighty blow.
The legitimacy of Russian forces deployed across North and west African countries has been consistently questioned by the international community in recent years. But it is not Russia’s mercenary forces’ legitimacy, but their effectiveness, which now stands in question following these attacks. After coordinated insurgent attacks on the northern city of Kidal, Russia’s Africa Corps confirmed on social media that they were retreating – leaving the city under the control of the insurgents.
This is one in a series of major defeats in recent years, according to Saikou Jammeh in the New York Times.
The loss of Kidal is symbolic as well as strategic. One Malian official said to Radio France International, “The Russians betrayed us in Kidal…they were warned three days before the attack but did nothing.” Kidal was secured in late 2023 by the Africa Corps, fighting alongside Malian forces. Its loss highlights a growing trend, backed by data from organisations such as the Global Terrorism Index (which places Mali 158th out of 163 in a ranking of safe countries) and ACLED, which shows countries in which Russia’s forces are providing security are losing ground to terrorists and insurgent groups, and violence has actually increased since their deployment.
In Mali specifically, the Africa Corps is increasingly abandoning the counterterrorism burden to Malian soldiers as it attempts to reduce its battlefield footprint and risk exposure. According to ACLED, although general violence is increasing, battles involving Russian forces dropped by 33 per cent between 2024 and 2025, with only 24 incidents with Russian forces reported in 2026. This signals a reduced Russian willingness to focus on achieving results, instead turning their focus to conflicts where lucrative contracts remain available, whilst reducing their risk exposure from kinetic combat.
Goita’s public comments that the situation is ‘under control’ and that his administration has dealt a ‘violent blow’ to the insurgents sound increasingly hollow, and the world will now be watching to see what happens. His Russian mercenary forces will be licking their wounds and assessing the relative return of continuing their ineffective campaign, as well as whether they will be booted out and replaced by alternative forces. Meanwhile, insurgents are running vast swathes of the country, and the citizens of Mali are being dragged further into a maelstrom of violence, paid for at their own expense.
Over the last six months, the United States has signalled a shift to engagement with the Sahel region. The impact of these recent attacks cannot be ignored in that context, with those governments looking past potentially failed support from Russian mercenaries to more long-term stable partnerships with countries like the United States.
Ovie Okorie, a law and defence analyst, writes from the University of Freetown, Sierra Leone
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