Regional organisations and integration in Africa are rooted in Pan-Africanism and the post-independence quest for unity, collective self-reliance, and development. Following the attainment of independence in the late 1950s and 1960s, African leaders recognized that political fragmentation and small national economies will clog the wheel of rapid socio-economic transformation and global influence. This led to the creation of continental and regional institutions, beginning with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now African Union, in 1963, aimed at promoting solidarity, sovereignty, and cooperation. Complementary regional economic communities such as ECOWAS, AMU, CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, IGAD and SADC emerged to foster economic integration, trade, and political coordination. Together, these efforts laid the institutional foundation for Africa’s contemporary integration agenda under the African Union.
At the global level, the challenges posed by world wars and economic upheavals necessitated the establishment of different international organisations with focus on political, social and economic matters, including the League of Nations, which later evolved into the United Nations, to promote global governance, human rights, peace and security, and economic cooperation. Today, however, the global order faces serious challenges as the rise of unilateral and individualistic policy approaches by some powerful countries gains traction. This development poses a significant threat to multilateralism and global governance and constitutes one of the major challenges confronting global integration and the contemporary international system.
The America’s new agenda of internal self-focus under the leadership of President Donald Trump’s best captured as “America First” doctrine, which prioritises domestic interests over multilateral commitments is one example that readily come to mind in this regard. This policy may begin to influence the policy and agenda of other countries with significant impacts on the operations of international collaborative organisations and integration. The America’s first policy emphasises the protection of United States of America and a reduction of reliance on international institutions, and a strong focus on national sovereignty. Under this agenda, US has, in recent past withdrawn from many international institutions, including several agencies of the United Nations, prioritising domestic socio-political and economic interests, while foreign policy is framed largely to promote direct and immediate benefits to the United States. This development will impact global order in different ways as captured below.
In Africa, the continent is beginning to witness the withdrawal of some countries from regional organisations, and this would impact negatively the regional integration aspiration as captured in Agenda 2063 – the Africa we want. In West Africa for example, a new development has evolved thereby shaking the foundation of the regional institution – the ECOWAS, and the regional integration agenda. For violating sections of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, particularly provisions relating to constitutional order, democratic governance, and unlawful seizure of civilian (democratic) rule by the military, the regional body suspended Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali from ECOWAS and imposed sanctions aimed at restoring civilian rule and adherence to democratic norms in these countries.
The pursuit of good and democratic governance by ECOWAS has, however, generated significant challenges for the organisation and its integration agenda. The suspension of certain member states by ECOWAS has led these countries to coalesce, culminating in the formation of the Community of Sahel States (CSS). The CSS-formally known by its French name, Alliance des États du Sahel (AES)-is a regional bloc established in September 2023 by the military-led governments of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. In other words, the CSS could be described as a regional military block with specific integration agenda similar to other regional aspirations but with unique regimental military operational mechanisms. The alliance is rooted in a shared commitment to collective security, sovereignty, and mutual defense, particularly in response to jihadist insurgency, external pressure, and perceived interference by regional and international actors. Beyond security cooperation, the Community of Sahel States seeks to deepen military-political coordination, economic integration, and strategic autonomy. This development signals a shift in West Africa’s regional order and poses a significant challenge to ECOWAS’s traditional socio-political and economic integration framework, with broader implications for Africa’s continental integration aspirations.
Similarly, the Horn of Africa represents another sub-region of the continent currently experiencing setbacks to regional integration. Eritrea, under President Isaias Afwerki, has maintained a turbulent relationship with its Horn of Africa neighbors. The country withdrew from the East African regional bloc, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), accusing the organisation of being used as a tool against states such as Eritrea. According to the BBC, this withdrawal occurred amid a fierce war of words between Eritrea and neighboring Ethiopia, raising fears of renewed armed conflict. Within this broader context, wealthier economies often dominate sub-regional agenda-setting, while poorer states struggle to meet financial obligations or align with integration policies that may not immediately serve their national interests, thereby weakening collective collaboration and the regional integration agenda.
In 2025, regional integration efforts by the African Union (AU), the East African Community (EAC), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to mediate peace and reconciliation between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda were unsuccessful. This failure opened the way for the United States to broker a peace agreement between the two countries. The reliance on external actors and mechanisms for such a critical peace process represents a significant setback to Africa’s continental integration agenda.
Another major challenge to regional integration in Africa is the problem of overlapping membership. Many African states belong to multiple regional organizations with similar mandates, resulting in duplication of initiatives, conflicting policies, and administrative inefficiencies. For instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) holds membership in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Such multiple and overlapping affiliations often undermine the effective implementation of collective decisions and weaken institutional coherence and credibility. Moreover, overlapping memberships create alternative spaces for strategic maneuvering by member states, enabling selective compliance and thereby diluting commitment to regional integration objectives.
Trade relationship and regional integration move in Africa over the past few years thus suggest that the future of African integration is not totally bleak. The digital economy, youthful population, and ongoing infrastructure transformation projects present new opportunities for convergence. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is gaining momentum, if effectively implemented, could transform Africa into a single market, stimulating industrialization and cross-border partnerships and regional economic integration.
A major challenge to the above trade interactions in Africa, however, is the continued restriction on the free movement of people across the continent. Many of the better-performing African economies tend to prioritize the free movement of goods and services while remaining reluctant to embrace the free movement of person. Although a majority of African Union (AU) member states have ratified the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which was adopted after the AU Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence, and Right of Establishment, the free movement of persons instrument has yet to enter into force. To date, only four of the fifty-five AU member states have ratified the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons. By contrast, the Agreement Establishing the AfCFTA, signed on 21 March 2018 in Kigali, Rwanda, entered into force rapidly on 30 May 2019, with the operational instruments governing trade under the AfCFTA regime launched in Niamey, Niger, in July 2019. Trading under the AfCFTA, however, officially commenced on 1 January 2021.
Prioritising the free movement of goods and services over the free movement of person undermines the logic of regional integration. Free movement of people and the free movement of goods and services are two sides of the same coin and must be pursued concurrently if regional integration in Africa is to be meaningful, impactful and sustainable.
Before I conclude, it is imperative to stress that majority of the African regional institutions are economically weak in carrying out their integration agenda due to poor contribution by member states leading to heavy dependence on external development partners and developed countries. Financial formulars that will guarantee sustainability of regional institutions towards the regional integration agenda in Africa should urgently be prioritized and commitment to these formulars guaranteed.
Finally, perennial disagreement among members of regional institutions in reaching final decision(s) is a huge challenge in some of the Africa regional economic and political institutions, thereby impacting regional integration agenda negatively. Africa must unite and speak with one voice at various international fora, including on issues relating to reform of the United Nations Security Council and other inter international financial institutions. Capacity building on negotiation and consensus building is therefore urgent and critical for members of various regional organizations across the continent.
In conclusion, Africa’s integration effort shows both hope and tension, driven by common goals but held back by ongoing structural challenges. The key task ahead is translating ambitious plans into real outcomes that improve the lives of Africans. Given Africa’s historical and contemporary need for unity at both continental and global levels, the member states of the African Union cannot afford to prioritise individualism over multilateralism.
John G. Ikubaje is the head of Transitional Justice programmes at the African Union Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He can be reached at [email protected].
The opinions expressed here are solely personal and do not represent the position of any institution or organisation.
