These are jottings and notes on Nigerian affairs written during my years in international development work. Although they are mostly commentaries on past events covering 1987-2000, they have relevance, in varying degrees, for the country’s present and future.
On “Cynical Tendency” in Nigerian Politics
The term, “cynical tendency” used in the lead article of West Africa (London) of July 13, 1987 appears to have a close relationship to the so-called “Militant Tendency” within the Labour Party in the United Kingdom. However, unlike the British parent term that stands for the orientation of a fringe or marginal group, the “Cynical Tendency” in Nigerian politics is probably a mainstream phenomenon. After the experiments with several forms of government under eight heads of state within 27 years, the average Nigerian would be behaving in a perfectly rational manner if he/she were instinctively cynical towards politics and politicians.
For some curious reasons, Nigerian military political leaders resent being described as politicians. I have always been struck by the distance they deliberately seek to establish between themselves and the politicians. Yet, the country has been ruled by military leaders during 18 of 27 post-independence years. It is only logical that they should share responsibility with civilian politicians for whatever might be the negative features of the Nigerian political culture that needs to be changed. There is a real sense in which the military political leaders’ “holier than thou” attitude vis-à-vis civilian politicians constitutes a strong factor pushing the average Nigerian to the “Cynical Tendency” school. After “collecting” or “seizing” power five times and actually running the government for two-thirds of the time, successive “corrective” military governments have not succeeded in turning things around. Why should anyone believe that the period 1987-1992 constitutes Nigeria’s magic dates with destiny, as the incumbent Babangida Administration is promising?
Although president Babangida speaks only of the “dawn” of a new era, it still amounts to a variation on the theme of a “new Nigeria” that most of his predecessors, both military and civilian, who had promised Nigerians, as if it could be achieved by the magic wand of rhetoric (Obasanjo’s “humane African society”) or dignified inaction (Shagari’s “ethical revolution”). However, a significant difference is Babangida’s apparent awareness of the prerequisites for the successful establishment of a new social order in the country. His summary of the prerequisites is largely accurate: “In our search for solutions in the past, we considered beautiful institutional arrangements without the supporting values which would make these institutions work. We tried to find approximate solutions to immediate and approximate problems without adequate attention to long-term problems which call for long and gradual but solid solutions. One of the cardinal tasks of this administration, therefore, is to bring about a new political culture which, like a veritable fountainhead, will bring forth a stable, strong, and dynamic economy.”
President Babangida’s diagnosis and prescription call for three comments. First, he is correct in making the observation that “beautiful institutional arrangements” will only work when the necessary values are present within the society where the institutions are expected to function. Second, his assertion that Nigeria needs a new political culture that would ensure congruence between institutional arrangements and societal values is incontrovertible. The third point to make relates to president Babangida’s mistaken view that his Administration can actually “bring about a new political culture” for Nigeria. His error here is typical of the assumption of the “men on horseback” (and their praise singers) who believe that the “resolve and certitude characteristic of [our] military profession’ (Babangida’s words) can successfully carry out social and political engineering within a few years. Political history teaches us that Babangida’s faith has no foundation whatsoever.
Pleading guilty to the charge of cynicism in advance, I wish to assert that by 1992, the Babangida Administration would not have brought about a new political culture in Nigeria. However, what we will find out between now and 1992 is whether the Babangida Administration would have taken steps that will begin to lay the foundation for the emergence of a new political culture whose salient features will be capable of sustaining a stable political order by the time Nigeria celebrates fifty years of nationhood in 2010. – July 1987.
Co-opting the Co-optables: The Babangida Style
During a brief visit to Ife on July 8th, two former colleagues observed that I would have become a co-opted associate of the Babangida administration if I had not left the country in January 1987. At first, I protested but I later gave in. Yes, one key element in Babangida’s political style is that he has co-opted all the cooptables. Since I know several of those who have been co-opted, I am aware of the various motivating factors: genuine commitment to national service; self-fulfilment (usually following dissatisfaction with current job); personal ambition (material gain, fame); sharing in the exercise of power (whether from the corridor or in the bedchamber). And there are those who self-recruit themselves through sheer opportunism and sycophancy.
Predictably, two or more factors could be present in the case of any given individual. Thus, by July 1988, the co-opted associates of the Babangida administration included articulate Nigerians who would normally qualify to be placed in any point on the political spectrum from the extreme left to the extreme right. But there were already signs that a few key co-opted associates could opt out before long: social critic Tai Solarin had been berating the Minister of Education for months while Nobel Laureate, Wole Soyinka, had raised loud opposition to the proscription of ASUU. Yet the nation was informed that all the activities of the Minister of Education enjoyed the full blessing of the President.
Undoubtedly, Babangida’s co-optation strategy has succeeded admirably. But in that success lie the seeds of future problems. Since a “Maradona” cannot continue scoring goals for ever (with or without the “hand of God”), the strategy will progressively become less and less effective. More importantly, the exit of a few key co-opted associates will deal a serious blow to the reputation of the regime. Will Babangida resort to increased arbitrariness or come up with another winning strategy? The former is almost certain to bring about his fall while the latter could ensure his survival to the proclaimed rendezvous of 1992. – July 1988
Babangida’s Nigeria, March 1989
After ten days of visits through Lagos, Oyo and Ondo states and several conversations with a cross-section of the citizenry, mostly members of the intelligentsia, I have come to the conclusion that the undeclared motto of the Babangida’s regime is: “Enrichissez-vous” (Get Rich). Yes, the president is the general overseer of a system of wealth sharing that seeks to take care of all those who, through one kind of connection or another, can “corner” for himself or herself a share of the national wealth. Patronage appointments into the Armed Forces Ruling Council, the cabinet, governorship positions, and the various leadership positions in parastatals, the civil service, the foreign service, and other government agencies are made with a conscious and deliberate plan to spread the access to some wealth among as many “key” persons as possible.
There are four major consequences of Babangida approach to governance. First, it presents the appearance of a broad-based, almost national government in which all regions, religions, ethnic and professional groups are represented. A few of the current “ins” are undoubtedly talented and dedicated and would qualify to be members of any randomly selected “government of talents” for the country (for example, Ransome-Kuti, Aminu, Falae, Larry Koinyan…). But there is no coherent, well-thought-out policy orientation to which the core of the ruling group subscribes. The structural adjustment programme (SAP) is probably the overarching policy framework but its various dimensions and interconnectedness are understood by only a handful. Indeed, key members of the core-ruling group undermine aspects of SAP by their acts of omission and commission. Equally significant is the way in which sectoral policies (education, health, transport, industry, energy etc.) bear the mark of individual ministers without the necessary linkages and interrelationships being given attention.
Second, because the president appears to be tolerant of each member of the “in” group making himself “comfortable”, the cautious, hesitant acquisition of material well-being embarked upon by each member in the first couple of years of the regime has progressively become very blatant and the size of acquisition has increased dramatically. The “demonstration effect” at the federal level is enthusiastically copied at the state level and it is also extended to many local governments. While this is not quite the same as the “looting” system of the Shagari era, it is a system of corruption (abuse of office for personal wealth and/or use of patronage to share public wealth among cronies) that could seriously compromise the chances of success of the SAP programme.
Arising from the first and second points, it does not appear that the management of the economy would benefit from some of the opportunities offered by SAP. The patronage system of appointment results in many square pegs in round holes in certain critically important posts (finance, budget, planning, science and technology) and several appointments to parastatals are not likely to produce positive results for the organisations concerned. It is possible that some pockets of good management exist but the overall situation is likely to be one of general mismanagement.
The fourth and final consequence of the Babangida style of governance is the significant defections from the ranks of critics who could either articulate alternative options for society or serve as the conscience of the mass of the population. For the first time in Nigerian political history, a large proportion of the articulate members of the mass media, the intelligentsia (academics, the professional associations) and the trade unions have been co-opted into the “ins” group, resulting in muted critical assessments of the regime. While this could be interpreted as the beginning of a broad-based “Establishment”, the negative characteristics of the Establishment’s current behaviour – institutionalised corruption and lack of a real direction for society – give cause for concern. – March 1989.
Babangida’s Nonsense
I wonder who he thinks that he is. After eight years in power, he is finally exposed for what I have always thought that he really is – a clever military politician with no principles and no real commitment to “One Nigeria”. He shot himself to power in August 1985 because he took advantage of his understanding of military politics. Similarly, he has managed to wield political power in Nigeria for the second longest stint because of clever manipulation of the cleavages, conflicts and contradictions that characterise Nigeria’s social, economic and political realities.
Whilst the staging of a successful military coup required only a brief period of manipulating military politics, civil governance has obliged him to constitute manipulation into a system of rule. When the features of the system emerged in their true colours, he was correctly nicknamed the “Maradona of Nigerian politics”. He loved the public acknowledgment and moved on logically to turn the political transition programme into a showpiece of manipulative politics. Progressively, the small number of people who correctly concluded by January 1986 (Nigeria’s membership of the Organisation of Islamic Countries madness and cover up) that Babangida’s rule could prove disastrous for the country was joined by a few others who began to talk of a “hidden agenda” in the implementation of the transition programme. As the rules of the political game continued to be changed with wanton arbitrariness, more and more people began to accept that Babangida is a false messiah.
However, the idea that Babangida had something to offer as a leader was boosted by the courageous and radical decisions that he took in the economic front in 1986. He accepted the advice that a full-blown market economy was the way out for Nigeria and introduced all the relevant economic policy reforms including foreign exchange reform, trade liberalisation and privatisation. But the implementation of these policies has been hindered by his manipulative system of rule. The backbone of the system is corruption which he has institutionalised. The main manifestations are the extensive patronage positions that he created for a significant number of the intelligentsia and the blatant use of the nation’s financial resources to buy political support from key interest groups: traditional rulers, labour unions, the press, academia and above all, the military.
I would attribute the success of Babangida’s manipulative politics to what I like to call the “politics of poverty”. All the beneficiaries of his crude patronage system and institutionalised corruption are people escaping from poverty, the first generation in their respective communities and ethnic groups to rise significantly above subsistence living. Babangida’s co-optation politics succeeded because the historical moment was right. But as is always the case that clever people invariably overreach themselves, that moment finally came for him in November 1992 when he postponed the final stage of the transition programme. Emperor Maradona’s nakedness was exposed for all to see.
The so-called final chapter of the political programme was decreed to begin from the grassroots, at the ward and village levels in early 19993. Those who still believed that Babangida could be trusted included General Gowon, a former Head of State. He threw his hat into the ring but was sent packing at the first hurdle. The non-believers (including the writer) were pleasantly surprised when the very final act of voting for a civilian president actually took place on June 12th. The peaceful conduct of elections was acknowledged by national and international observers who proclaimed the elections free, fair and credible. The biggest surprise of all (at least, for me) was the decisiveness of M. K. O. Abiola’s victory, an unambiguous and emphatic vote for “one Nigeria.”
Babangida’s annulment of the result of the June 12 elections confirmed the point made earlier regarding his lack of commitment to “one Nigeria”. (He most certainly fought the civil war out of duty and not out of conviction). The annulment also revealed his total commitment to and unlimited faith in, manipulative politics. More importantly, the annulment marked the beginning of his end. Only two questions remain: when will the end come and in what circumstances? He has exposed Nigerians at home and abroad to ridicule and he certainly does not deserve a decent end. – 11 July 1993.
Nigeria at a Crossroads
As we approach the mid-point of the last decade of the 20th century, Nigeria is at a crossroads in every sense of the word. The triumph of the military party in the face of a disunited civilian elite (who should lead the civilian party) is the most eloquent testimony of a crisis that is evident in every sphere: economic, political and social.
When the unfolding political crisis began in November 1992 with the cancellation of presidential election primaries and the postponement of elections until June 1993, I confidently predicted that continuation of military rule beyond January 1994 would not be tolerated by Nigerians. I was confident that Babangida would disappear from the scene one way or the other. I also knew that Sonekan’s first coming in the shape of a Transitional Council would not do any good for the country. Finally, I was confident that the Sonekan-led Interim National Government would not last its six-month term. All my predictions proved true except the apparent perpetuation of military rule. What really happened? How would it all unfold and, put more bluntly, what future for Nigeria?
What really happened? I would have to admit that as a temporary expatriate Nigerian, the facts that are available to me are limited. On the basis of conversations with two intellectual giants [one from a southern state and the other from a northern state] between 28th November and 2nd December, and with insights derived from three visits to Nigeria between January and October 1993, I would like to record the following:
The forces mobilised to send Babangida packing on or before August 27th 1993 – his self-imposed final departure deadline), were too strong for him to resist successfully. In the end, he had to bow out in disgrace. Babangida’s die-hard supporters among both the civilian and military elite groups were outnumbered and the external environment was openly hostile.
The anti-Babangida coalition began to show cracks as soon as he disappeared from the scene. Position taken for or against Babangida-imposed Interim National Government (ING), led by the feckless Sonekan, separated the two factions that emerged within the civilian elite. Although the ING was at the centre of the split, the polarization also took on the coloration of existing dichotomies: SPD/NRC, ethnic, linguistic, geopolitical and religious. However, because the June 12 electoral verdict had revealed Nigerians’ preparedness to de-emphasize these dichotomies (thereby affirming an unprecedented commitment to ONE Nigeria), supporters and opponents of ING were found across the barriers of these dichotomies. There were, of course, some outstanding “solidarities”: the Yoruba of the South-west massively rejected ING as did the press and pro-democracy NGOs. On the other hand, the majority of the Hausa-Fulani elite and a significant proportion of Ibo elite were pro-ING. Significantly, whatever disagreements were in the military were kept “en famille”. But there were rumours that the military was also divided like the rest of the society but outsiders did not know the details.
ING’s collapse was heralded by its inability to mobilise society for new presidential and local government elections scheduled for February 19994 and its inability to proceed with the “probe” of the results of the June 1993 elections. It was dealt a fatal blow when a Lagos High Court declared it illegal. When the military leadership decided to “collect powers” in the looming vacuum, the civilian elite was not organised to pose a challenge. Indeed, indecent scrambling for sharing power ensued, largely along inter- and intra-party lines but with due attention to the other dichotomies mentioned above. The military moved swiftly to quash dissent within its own ranks while it proceeded with the easier task of applying the tested “divide and rule” formula in dealing with the civilian elite. The civilians offered little or no resistance and the country was returned to military rule after 83 days of ING. (A curious element in all this was the provision in the Decree establishing the ING on the designation of the most senior “Secretary” in the Government as the successor to the Head of State in the event of the latter’s resignation. General Abacha who was the designated most senior Secretary in the ING sensed an opportune moment to ask the weak and fumbling ING head to resign; and he obliged!)
Economic Basis of Political Behaviour: One powerful message that has emerged from the exercise of political power in Nigeria since the 1970s is that it constitutes an escape from poverty for those who directly exercise it and those who are their associates. A few daring ones make it through direct looting of the national treasury; some through rent-seeking activities, and others through jobs provided by the state. The over-concentration of economic power (notably oil revenues) at the federal level accounts for the intense struggle for the control of the presidency. The mix-bag of civilians who are in Abacha’s cabinet comprise established rent-seekers, perpetual dependents on state offices and an assorted number of opportunists. A handful of apparently competent and honest public servants in the “team” would have to prove that they are different. As for the military leadership, General Abacha himself was a key participant in the institutionalisation of corruption during Babangida’s rule. Military rule and institutionalised corruption undermined the economic policy reforms embarked upon in 1986 to the disadvantage of the Nigerian society: the deepening of poverty, decay of the educational system, crumbling infrastructure and virtually non-existent health services. If Abacha’s rule would mean more of the same (I cannot see how it would be different), then, what future for Nigeria?
Whither Nigeria? I had thought that a decision on whether a mismanaged Nigeria should be kept ONE at all costs should be postponed until 1998 or 1999. Today, (December 3rd 1993), I am convinced that the issue should be resolved within the next 24 months. Disintegration is an option that should be put on the table for free and frank discussion. What is needed is a system of rule that would allow the harnessing of the country’s human and natural resources for the benefit of all its citizens. That system of rule would not be military-led. It should be a federal democracy with significantly reduced powers at the federal level together with other characteristics similar to those set out in the November 1991 issue of Publius, The Journal of Federalism devoted to “Federalism in Nigeria”. – 3 December 1993.
Postscript: As a member of the Nigerian elite living abroad at this point in time, I feel hobbled, humbled and humiliated.
June 12 and the Future of Nigeria
In a conversation with a colleague in IMF on January 3/95, I had to spell out my commitment to the June 12 Movement. He had compared the June 23 annulment of the June12/93 presidential elections to the Buhari coup that sacked Shagari administration in December 1983. Furthermore, he mentioned that the Constitutional Drafting Assembly had agreed on rotational presidency with the next president coming from the South. He concluded that the country could move on from this point.
I responded by highlighting three main reasons why the future of Nigeria – rather, whether Nigeria has a meaningful future – is tied to June 12.
The Babangida argument that key persons (dominant group) within the military did not want MKO Abiola, the winner of the June 12 elections to become president is the ultimate illustration of military diktat. This should not be allowed to stand. Tens of soldiers should not be able to reject the electoral verdict handed down by 14 million+ Nigerians. Above all, for me as a fundamentalist against military rule, this form of military arrogance must be resisted.
The pattern of voting for MKO Abiola that cut across existing dichotomies – North/South, Christian/Muslim, inter-ethnic and majority/minority – was a loud assertion of the wishes of Nigerians across these divides to constitute ONE nation-state. Significantly, this was done through peaceful, free and fair elections, attested to by both internal and external observers. Rejection of the mandate and legitimacy conferred by this vote raises serious questions regarding the extent of commitment to one Nigeria by those responsible for the annulment and their supporters. And will electoral legitimacy ever be respected in the country if the annulment is allowed to stand?
The “talk” that MKO Abiola would not be president because he is a Yoruba southerner is widely linked to the assertion or perception that Hausa-Fulani northerners wish to continue to hold the topmost political position in the land. The crucial question is whether all Nigerians are free to compete for the top leadership position and, if successful, assume that responsibility. In other words, are all Nigerians entitled to equal political rights? If the answer were to be in the negative, then the idea of keeping Nigeria one would have to be abandoned.
At the end of the conversation, we agreed that an immediate first step toward keeping Nigeria one is to transform the central government into a small authority with other powers and resources transferred to states, local governments and the private sector. Here is an area where some forward thinking could continue while the prevailing mess is sorted out.
– January 1995.
Salvaging Nigeria
Personal commitment to salvaging Nigeria is for three reasons: (i) concern with my social relevance after retirement [from the World Bank); (ii) ensuring that Nigeria is a country of which my children would be proud; and (iii) salvaging a country whose success could make a big qualitative difference to the overall development of Sub-Saharan Africa.
– January 28/95.
Abuja
Is Abuja (Nigeria’s capital since December 1991) a good idea? Yes. I have always supported the need for a central political capital to promote a sense of belonging to one Nigeria. However, the corrupt practices associated with building the capital (e.g., Julius Berger/Babangida and Abacha/Chagoury & Chagoury) and the political crisis cum economic decay from the early 1990s to date have significantly undermined the justification for Abuja. Abuja has become a reality but will it help to enhance national unity? The future will tell. – 29 August 1995.
Nigeria, Haiti, and the Black Race
One issue evoked by an academic colleague in the context of our discussion of the Nigerian condition is whether the prospect of a “failed” state would not confirm the 200-year failure in Haiti. (Cf. Kole Omotoso’s Season of Migration to the South). Success in South Africa would likely be attributed to the mixed racial composition, notwithstanding Nelson Mandela’s contribution.
I reject this thesis of racial incompetence to run a modern state and my outstanding illustration of an exception is the Yoruba South West of Nigeria. I am convinced that the Region would today be in the ranks of the NICs (Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) if it had existed as an autonomous country. Free primary education was successfully launched in 1955 and evolution towards republicanism was already advanced by 1965. And the first African Nobel Laureate in Literature demonstrated the vitality of Yoruba culture whose interface with universal culture he has firmly established.
Of course, it is also true that the failed states of Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi and Liberia as well as others characterised by civil strife – Sudan, Zaire and Sierra Leone – are the worst examples across the continents. But there is a strong tendency to see Nigeria as the litmus test of Black (racial) competence (one of every four Black African is a Nigerian) and if she fails (disintegrates either Soviet-style or Yugoslavia-style), there would be a strong urge to proclaim vindication of racial incompetence. But could this also be the opportunity for the emergence of a couple of Black African success stories? – 2 September, 1995.
Abacha’s Exit and the Nigeria Political Crisis
On Monday, June 8, the death of Nigeria’s worst ruler, killer Abacha, was announced. He reportedly died of heart attack in the early hours of the day. He was buried on the same day, in accordance with Muslim rites. His corpse was transported in the cargo hole of an air force plane from Abuja to his adopted hometown, Kano. (He was a Kanuri from Maiduguri in the north east). He was buried hurriedly without any special honours. And the majority of Nigerians were almost certainly of the view that he deserved no honours. Of the reports on the joyful celebration of his death in parts of the country, the story of over 10,000 souls on the streets of Ilorin was the most striking.
Abacha was an evil man both in his physical outlook (the infamous dark glasses) and in his inner thoughts that were rarely expressed in words but manifested in a succession of political assassinations and murders, repression of pro-democracy and human rights groups and a gradual build up of a Nigerian “Gulag”. The hanging of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight others in November 1995 in disregard of world-wide appeals for clemency was the first clear sign that he was a murderous tyrant. The fact that Nigeria could produce its own Amin (of Uganda) baffled all Nigerians of my generation and the older ones. The hangings were followed by the incarceration of more than two dozen opponents of his rule for alleged involvement in an abortive coup against him. The list included a former head of state (Obasanjo) and his deputy (Shehu Yar’Ardua), journalists, political activists, and pro-democracy and human-rights champions. A succession of arbitrary detentions (e.g., Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, the former Sultan of Sokoto) and repressive acts followed, including political murders and assassinations (Kudirat Abiola) and treason charges against political exiles (Wole Soyinka, Enahoro …).
In September 1996, I decided to adopt a short-term plan that excludes Nigeria. And in April 1997, I informed my mother that I would not visit Nigeria until further notice. I also suspended work on the private library that I was trying to complete for my retirement. Within the limits that my international civil servant position allowed, I continued with limited activism in opposition politics. I had attended a one-day seminar devoted to Nigeria’s political crisis by the US National Endowment for Democracy in November 1994 (Wole Soyinka was the keynote speaker). My major contribution was the assertion that a Nigeria where equality of all citizens was not respected, both in theory and in practice, does not deserve to be salvaged. And in September 1996, I attended the First Congress of Free Nigerians of which Wole Soyinka and Enahoro were the conveners. In my short contribution, I stressed the need to steadfastly uphold the legitimacy represented by the 12 June, 1993 presidential elections which was also an affirmation of the public’s commitment to Nigerian unity, demonstrating that the dichotomies of religion, ethnicity, geography and ideological orientations could be accommodated. I added that abandoning this legitimacy would raise serious doubts about whether Nigeria deserves to be kept as one country. By April 1998, I became convinced that a push for autonomy and self-governance for the Yoruba and other nationalities who wanted it must be included in the re-negotiated terms for keeping Nigeria one. This is closely linked to the convening of a National Sovereign Conference where such binding decisions would be adopted. (I am resolved to participate in the Conference at my own expense).
A critical dimension to the Nigerian political crisis is the succession of sycophants that have served the two dictators, Babangida and Abacha, who have, between them, undermined the fragile unity of the country. The sycophants and position seekers from the Yoruba West are the most worrisome because of the prominence of some of them and the shame that all of them bring on their national group. None of them was able to influence any important actions throughout Abacha’s inglorious rule. Indeed, the ignominious exits of a few prominent ones – Jakande, Onagoruwa and Diya – further underscored both their irrelevance and the embarrassment that they caused their peoples. – N’Djamena, Chad, 28 June 1998.
Conversations With Bishop Gbonigi and Chief Olu Falae
Agreement on the missed opportunity of a period of a Government of National Unity after General Abdulsalami’s short stint. The three-year period would have been used for the formation of parties and a full debate on the future of Nigeria. The hurried “democratic” contraption installed in May 1999 is creaking in several parts after only 12 months. The persistent executive/legislative conflicts are the most glaring manifestations. This reflects the serious internal contradictions of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).
The most credible way forward is the organisation of a Sovereign National Conference during the second year of Obasanjo Administration. Use of “sovereign” could be a distraction (Chief Enahoro and Chief Falae’s perspectives need to be reconciled on this). Bishop Gbonigi would be an active player in the process. The Yoruba position on autonomy enjoys very broad support with Chief Cornelius Adebayo as the most credible leader on the Middlebelt (Kwara/Kogi) front. He would also be among the key players at the national level.
There are still some pending issues to resolve regarding Yoruba solidarity. Obasanjo’s genuine position on political restructuring is unclear. Does he still maintain a militarist conception of Nigerian unity? The Yoruba Parapo and Afenifere approaches are still not fully reconciled. What is Chief Bola Ige’s position on autonomy today? How effective is Senator Adesanya as the “leader”? Ooni’s disastrous role in the Ife/Modakeke battles remains worrisome. However, when push comes to shove and the future of Nigeria has to be decided in the next year or so, the vast majority of Yoruba is certain to strongly support autonomy for the nationalities. This is the only way in which we stand a chance of restoring “life more abundant” to our people by 2025. Chief Falae fully shared my total commitment to this overarching goal. – June 2000.
‘Ladipo Adamolekun writes from Iju, Akure North, Ondo State.
