The pursuit of secession and Israeli recognition by Somaliland’s Isaaq-dominated leadership is not a strategic breakthrough; it is a serious miscalculation. It repeats historical errors, deepens internal divisions, and exposes Somali territory to external conflicts without delivering meaningful gains.
The eagerness of the Isaaq-dominated leadership of the territory commonly known as Somaliland — now excluding Sool and much of Sanaag — to pursue secession from Somalia and seek diplomatic recognition from Israel defies political logic, historical experience, and basic strategic judgment.
The arguments advanced in support of Somaliland’s secession have been debated for decades. While they resonate with segments of the Isaaq community, the overwhelming majority of Somalis reject the claim that secession is either justified or beneficial.
The state violence committed by the military regime that ruled Somalia between 1969 and 1991 against Somali citizens is well documented and was not limited to the Isaaq community, although it suffered severely and disproportionately. Other clans also endured collective punishment and repression. These abuses led to the formation of armed rebel movements — many supported by Ethiopia, Somalia’s historic adversary — culminating in the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 and a prolonged civil war.
Historical Irony and Repeated Errors
What is both ironic and tragic is that Somaliland’s Isaaq-dominated leadership has replicated the very practices that once justified resistance against the Siad Barre regime.
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The Isaaq, Dhulbahante, Warsangeli, Gadabuursi, and Ciise communities are all indigenous to the former British Somaliland territory. However, since declaring secession from Somalia in 1991, Somaliland gradually evolved into an Isaaq-centric political entity. Other clans increasingly resented marginalisation and complained of being treated as subordinate minorities — offered accommodation rather than equal partnership and genuine political inclusion.
This exclusion eventually triggered armed conflict. In 2022, the Dhulbahante community rose up against Hargeisa’s authority, citing oppression, marginalisation, and denial of political rights — the very same grievances once raised by the Isaaq against the military government in Mogadishu.
The response of the Isaaq-dominated Somaliland administration to Dhulbahante grievances was infamous: dissent was branded as rebellion or separatism, followed by military pressure and ultimately the use of violence. The militarised reaction mirrored the logic and conduct of the dictatorship whose crimes are repeatedly invoked to justify secession.
After a bloody conflict, the result was the effective separation of Sool and Sanaag regions — inhabited by Dhulbahante and Warsangeli communities — from Somaliland and the emergence of a new autonomous federal member state within the Federal Republic of Somalia.
Recognition from a highly controversial actor — without continental or international legitimacy — offers symbolism without sovereignty, and risk without reward. Somalia, including the Somaliland regions, needs peace, internal cohesion, and constructive international engagement, not geopolitical adventurism.
A Fragmented Political Entity
Today, Somaliland is neither politically, geographically, nor socially comparable to former British Somaliland.
The Dhulbahante have withdrawn from Hargeisa’s authority, and their territory is now firmly part of Somalia. Similarly, the Warsangeli areas are either aligned with Puntland or the Northeastern State — both integral components of the Somali federal system. The Gadabuursi and Ciise communities oppose secession and support Somali unity, even while remaining under Somaliland administration.
Claims that Somaliland represents a consensual, democratic, and representative polity are therefore untenable. In reality, it is an Isaaq-dominated political project lacking internal legitimacy, territorial coherence, and constitutional consent.
The Gambit of Israeli Recognition: A Strategic Ploy
Against this backdrop, Somaliland’s fixation on recognition — particularly from Israel — is not only counterproductive but also ill-timed and dangerously destabilising.
This pursuit is not new. In 1994, former Somali Prime Minister and later Somaliland President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal (AUN) formally requested recognition from Israel. The request received no response. For decades, Israel showed little interest.
What has changed today is not Somaliland’s legitimacy or maturity, but the volatility of regional geopolitics.
The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor have become among the world’s most unstable geopolitical theatres, due to factors including:
- The war in Gaza
- Open discussions of depopulating Gaza of its native Palestinian population
- The ongoing conflict between Israel and the Houthis
- Intense military competition over control of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab
- By seeking alignment with Israel at this moment, Somaliland’s leadership risks dragging Somali-inhabited territory into proxy conflicts it neither controls nor benefits from.
History is unforgiving to leaders who exaggerate grievances for political expediency or lack the vision to prioritise long-term societal interests. Somaliland’s people do not succeed in isolation. Their future success lies within Somalia’s democratic statehood.
The Core Question: What Does the Isaaq Community Gain?
What tangible short-, medium-, or long-term benefits does the Isaaq community gain from receiving a controversial Israeli recognition that is:
- Opposed by the African Union
- IGAD member countries
- Rejected by the United Nations and its Security Council, including all five permanent members
- Condemned by the Arab League
- Rejected by Islamic organisations
- Rejected by the European Union
- Rejected by international Islamic scholars
Recognition from a highly controversial actor — without continental or international legitimacy — offers symbolism without sovereignty, and risk without reward. Somalia, including the Somaliland regions, needs peace, internal cohesion, and constructive international engagement, not geopolitical adventurism.
Shared Identity, History, and a Common Future
There is no moral, historical, or political basis for hostility between Somaliland’s people and Somalia as a nation, or toward the Somali people as a whole. The crimes of a dictatorship do not belong to an entire society. Somalis collectively paid an immense price — in human suffering and economic destruction — to end authoritarian rule.
The Isaaq community shares language, religion, culture, history, environment, and blood ties with the rest of the Somali people. Its future — economically, socially, and geopolitically — is inseparable from Somalia’s future.
Importantly, Somalia has moved away from the destructive centralism of the past. The federal system, adopted in response to decades of abuse, limits excessive concentration of power and empowers federal member states to manage local security, justice, and development. The Isaaq community stands to gain far more from strengthening and refining this federal system than from a secession project that has failed to alter Somaliland’s international status for more than three decades. Israeli recognition will not change this reality.
Conclusion
The pursuit of secession and Israeli recognition by Somaliland’s Isaaq-dominated leadership is not a strategic breakthrough; it is a serious miscalculation. It repeats historical errors, deepens internal divisions, and exposes Somali territory to external conflicts without delivering meaningful gains.
History is unforgiving to leaders who exaggerate grievances for political expediency or lack the vision to prioritise long-term societal interests. Somaliland’s people do not succeed in isolation. Their future success lies within Somalia’s democratic statehood.
Mohamud M Uluso, a former governor of the Central Bank of Somalia among many senior service positions under Somali governments, is now an economic and political analyst, as well as a good governance and peace advocate for Somalia.
